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Editorial
PHILOSOPHY, ARGUMENTATION AND 
FANATISM
Heiner Mercado Percia4
During a class of the course on Philosophy and Rhetoric, a student expressed his views on the 
impossibility to settle many of our disagreements through dialogue. He would say that proof 
of this fact was the impossibility to convince a religious fanatic to stop using his body as an 
instrument to leap into terrorist action. The argument on the disagreements developed within a 
presentation of Walter Brice Gallie’s thesis (1998) on “essentially contested concepts”, also called 
“controversial concepts”. According to this British philosopher, influenced by Wittgenstein’s 
theses, traditional philosophy has unsuccessfully dealt with the issue of disagreement on the 
definitions of certain fundamental concepts.
When it comes to the definition of such controversial concepts, persuading opponents about 
the convenience of certain definitions has been said to be the solution, in fervent belief that 
such opponents will eventually agree, or accept the impossibility to find a rational certainty of 
which definition is better. For Gallie, the notion that philosophy could be taken as some kind 
of “engine of thought” getting rid of conceptual confusions is basically a rebutted idea. On 
the contrary, it seems necessary to examine different uses of terms, and the main arguments 
to introduce them. This way to look at the problem makes it evident that there is not such a 
thing as THE standard or proper use of a contested term (1998, p.6). Although one could think 
that identifying different uses and functions of controversial terms may help settle disputes 
between contradicting parties, the truth is that each side remains in its defense position, 
leaning on equally convincing arguments and evidence. It would seem here that no theory 
of argumentation can be held as legitimate, if it is to be understood as the one to build tools 
to settle any dispute over opposite positions. This is considered another defeat for traditional 
philosophy and its confidence in the likelihood of schools, trends, political groups or common 
people having an argument to accept those definitions opposing the ones they defend, thus 
putting a stop to religious, ethical, political, esthetic or scientific disputes.
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The question raised by Gallie is precisely related to the worth of those apparently ceaseless 
arguments for philosophy. Should it keep on searching for a general principle to settle the issue 
of which rival use is right? Or, on the contrary, should it give up that search and sink into what 
has been labeled by Stuart Hampshire as “new obscurantism”, or the disrepute of reason as 
an effective means to settle conflict? Gallie says: “In spite of not being solvable through any 
kind of argument, [essentially contested concepts] rely on perfectly respectable arguments 
and evidence. This is what I mean by saying there are essentially contested concepts, concepts 
whose appropriate use implies, inevitably, endless arguments among users about the proper 
uses” (1988, p.8)
To Gallie, what really matters is keeping this halo of respectability and rationality around 
the disputing positions, and aiming at the search of tools, called semi-formal conditions, 
allowing the identification of really controversial and permanently shifting concepts. Essentially 
contested concepts are those which lack “an agreement between the user and whoever 
disputes its particular usage, in reference to that kind of usage that is considered appropriate 
for the concept at issue” (1998, 5), and where, in spite of the impossibility to finish the argument 
on determining the right definition, the conflict is perfectly legitimate (1998, p.8).
By means of a game, (an artificial) point of departure with competing teams in permanent 
struggle, the acceptance of one criterion to determine the champion becomes difficult to 
everyone, given that each party proposes its own tenet. Gallie claims seven semi-formal 
conditions that should be met by any concept of this kind: (I) It must be evaluative, that is, the 
concept should certify some kind of acknowledged achievement; (II) the achievement must be 
internally complex in its structure; (III) the explanation of its worth should include references to 
the share of contributions made by each party; (IV) the concept should admit modifications in 
case of shifting conditions, and those modifications should not be predictable; (V) each player 
or group acknowledges that the use they give to the concept is being challenged by other groups 
and is aware of the criteria their adversaries rely on; (VI) the concept in dispute must have spun 
off from an original model whose authority is acknowledged by all the rival users or players; 
and finally (VII) the concept is kept and it develops because there is controversy that allows 
such development. The first five conditions provide a definition of essential contestability, but 
do not allow the distinction between legitimate and inadequate uses, which is why conditions 
six and seven have to be added (1998, p. 20).
Gallie applies these conditions to the concepts of art, Christian life, democracy and social 
justice. The concept of ‘democracy’ is essentially contested because (I) it is evaluative; in fact, 
it is the evaluative concept par excellence. Proof of this is the fact that any important political 
decision (likely to be compared with a move in the game) made in the last 150 years, has usually 
been assessed as either democratic or not. That is to say, from Gallie’s perspective, important 
political decisions are usually either accepted or rejected. The concept of democracy complies 
with conditions (II) and (III), since it is internally complex, and admits a variety of descriptions 
in which its sundry aspects are classified into diverse orders of importance. It also complies 
with condition (IV) given its open character, that is, because democratic aspirations change 
in a particular society, according to their circumstances. Besides (V) “the concept […] may be 
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employed both aggressively and defensively” (1998, p. 28). (VI) Its different uses “claim for a 
model’s authority”, such as that of the French revolution and (VII) “competition is likely to […] by 
acknowledging rival uses […] lead to the optimum development of both the fuzzy aims, and the 
bewildering achievements of democratic tradition” (1998, p. 28)
I think the most important thing about this approach is its isolation of empirical facts as 
means to study political concepts such as democracy and social justice. Therefore, we face 
a kind of analysis in which the significance of concepts is not derived from “facts”, or from 
research providing the tools to choose the right one among rival uses. Although the argument 
about the ‘right’ use of these concepts may never end, according to Gallie, it is possible, by 
means of this awareness and new views on the nature of language, “to show the rationality 
of a certain individual’s continuous usage (or in the most drastic case of conversion: usage 
change) of the concept at issue” (1998, p.31). Nevertheless, two consequences could arise from 
this idea: a positive and a negative one. The former, very optimistic indeed, suggests that the 
acknowledgement of the essential contestability of a given concept will yield an improvement 
of the arguments and discussions between the rival groups. The latter, the negative one, is 
that the defense of each group’s usage of the concept will persist, as well as the attempts to 
get rid of the opponent, as knockout is thought to be the only way to ensure victory, which 
unfortunately leads to persistently using one’s own body as a weapon to defend a cause 
through the elimination of the Other (1998, p. 36-37).
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